



Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education

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*Civil-Military
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Contents

Foreword v

About the Author vi

1. Introduction 1

2. Historical Context of Civil-Military Operations 3

3. Current Guidance 17

4. Views from the Field 27

5. Conclusions and Recommendations 35

Endnotes..... 37

Bibliography 49

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Foreword

The chaotic situations leading to the rich history, vignettes, and importance of civil-military operations (CMO) encompass missions requiring diplomatic, informational, military, and economic prowess on every level. From infantry squad to Army Group, from hamlet to country, and from assisting local tribal leaders to replacing entire political regimes with their ideologies and institutions, the examples are endless. From the Mexican War of 1846 through both theaters of war in World War II to present-day operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fact remains that armies of all types must plan for and execute CMO as part of the overall political-military campaign.

Ironically though, CMO has yet to be included as a core foundational learning area of officer Professional Military Education (PME). Although some aspects are addressed at various levels, CMO has yet to assume a position of relevance commensurate with the historical number of missions conducted and resources expended throughout the history of the US Armed Forces.

Time is a daunting enemy facing both the commandants of the service PME institutions and commanders of special operations forces (SOF) when preparing for operations. It may be understandable then why units spend the majority of available time on the combat-related, life-threatening skills. Only when a situation affording extra time occurs can unit commanders look beyond the combat-related, kinetic skills to the secondary skills required to fully win the peace—transitioning from their primary role to something other than primary—something required in that phase of the campaign following combat.

In this monograph, the author addresses the historical, legal, doctrinal, and operational reasons CMO should be included in core PME. He discusses the impacts of this omission on the SOF assigned to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and suggests that the time to correct the oversight is now.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon
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About the Author

James F. Powers, Jr. is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University under contract with Science Applications International Corporation. Since his retirement from the military in 2001, he has served as a special operations consultant supporting the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) and a program manager for the Dean, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Before his retirement from active duty as a US Army Special Forces Colonel, he served as the Director, Special Operations and Faculty Instructor at the US Army War College. Other military duties have included command of the US Army's only active duty Civil Affairs battalion, and various command and staff assignments in the United States, Korea, and Germany.

Powers is a graduate of the University of Alabama, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College. He earned a Master's Degree in Public Administration at Shippensburg University (Pennsylvania).

He is the coauthor of *Civil Affairs: A Function of Command, Military Review* (1995) and the author of *National Assistance and Civil-Military Operations: The Gap in Professional Military Education*, US Army War College (1996). As a Faculty Instructor at the US Army War College, he authored three core lessons and five electives: Special Operations, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Civil-Military Operations, and Special Operations Case Studies.

1. Introduction

On 2–3 June 1999, the National Defense University (NDU) hosted a symposium entitled: “Beyond Jointness: Civil-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance.” LTG Richard A. Chilcoat, then President of NDU, set the tone for the symposium in his opening remarks.

Military leaders have historically been ill-prepared to deal with the ambiguities of civil-military operations or to integrate their efforts effectively with the increasingly diverse array of civilian partners involved. Civil-military responsibilities may be necessary to secure victory, but military leaders have never eagerly welcomed them. In the midst of the American Civil War, William T. Sherman acknowledged the demanding nature of civil-military missions when he complained that ironically, “success was crippling our armies in the field by detachments to guard and protect the interests of a hostile population.” Charles Magoon’s 1903 report on the Caribbean territories identified inadequacies similar to those we find today: in military training for civil tasks and in the cooperation between US military and civilian agencies. Irwin Hunt’s report after World War I found American training and organization inadequate to the task of post-conflict operations.¹

The story of CMO during WWII ranges from assisting villages to replacing Fascist and Nazi ideology and institutions. The impact of these activities is evident in General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s letter to General George C. Marshall a few weeks after Germany’s surrender in 1945.

The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military’s scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.²

Since WWII these same type activities have become no less important. The experiences of one officer further emphasize the historical lessons.

Anyone who is strictly a combat-arms soldier and doesn’t see or feel the need for CMO or how CMO can help is unbelievably mistaken. Even those not convinced of the mantra of “winning the hearts and minds” must appreciate the most effective use of CMO: intelligence gathering.³

This monograph addresses the background and reasons CMO should be incorporated as core Professional Military Education (PME) and the impacts on the SOF assigned to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The reasons for this omission are much less important than correcting the omission.

During the establishment of USSOCOM the rationale for leveraging the existing Service PME institutions for SOF PME was wise. Exposing special operations officers to service and joint doctrines/concepts develops a synergy not otherwise attained.

Nevertheless, this exposure to Service and joint doctrine has slowly caused gaps in the continuing PME of special operations officers.⁴ The gaps were unperceivable and caused only minor perturbations in officer professional development. It appeared as if on-the-job training was actually a synonym for SOF Continuing Education.

This monograph identifies factors that will lead towards enhancing Joint Professional Military Education for SOF. The objectives are:

1. Identify historical examples of CMO as they relate to PME.
2. Identify the legal basis for CMO in PME.
3. Identify the directive and doctrinal basis for CMO in PME.
4. Identify essential CMO skills and planning factors required for post-conflict operations.
5. Provide recommendations for narrowing the gap in CMO PME for SOF.

To accomplish these objectives this monograph identified four areas directly affecting core PME for SOF:

- **The Historical Context of CMO** is provided in Section 2.
- **Current Guidance: The Law and DoD Directives** are discussed in Section 3.
- **Views from the Field** are provided in Section 4.
- **The author's Conclusions and Recommendations** are provided in Section 5.

2. Historical Context of Civil-Military Operations

This chapter provides a frame of reference for understanding CMO and why senior leaders at every level must be educated. Presented first is the current doctrinal overview of CMO. A discussion and analysis of historical examples of CMO follow.

Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the melding of responsibilities and obligations facing commanders when their operations encounter civilians within the area of operations.




Figure 1. CMO results when civil society and military operations overlap.

The following definition provides the conceptual framework. Reality, however, provides the actual definitive examples.

Civil-military operations (CMO) encompass the activities that joint force commanders (JFCs) take to establish and maintain positive relations between their forces, the civil authorities, and the general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are employed in order to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve US objectives.⁵

The types of CMO are further described:

Foreign humanitarian assistance is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions.

Populace and resource control assists host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers and resources to preclude complicating problems that may hinder accomplishment of the JFC's mission.

Nation assistance operations involve civil or military assistance rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation.

Military civic action involves activities intended to win support of the local population for the foreign nation and its military. Military civic actions are predominantly conducted by indigenous military personnel, while US forces provide advice, supervision, or technical support.

Emergency services are all those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: minimize the effects upon the civilian population which would be caused by a disaster; deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such disaster; and effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such disaster.

Civil administration is a unique action undertaken by US commanders only when directed or approved by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Civil administration support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory.

Domestic support operations usually occur after a Presidential declaration of a major disaster and are designed to supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments and voluntary organizations. The US military normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of another agency.⁶

US military doctrine has used a linear approach to planning and conducting operations: desired events can be envisioned and sequenced chronologically to occur in stages or phases. This facilitates transition of not only thought, but manpower, resources, and transfer of authority/handoff. Phases refer to overall efforts and not the actions of particular elements within the force, i.e. every unit in an operation may not be active within the same phase as other units. For example, bulk fuel handlers, cooks, engineers, and nurses perform their skills without regard for any phase designation. To assure uniformity within the conceptual process DoD has

US military doctrine has used a linear approach to planning and conducting operations ...

directed that future publications will require plans to be structured in six phases:

Phase 0: Shape

Phase I: Deter

Phase II: Seize the Initiative

Phase III: Dominate

Phase IV: Stabilize

Phase V: Enable Civil Authority.⁷

The lessons derived from military operations further supported this linear approach. During the Vietnam War, however, US military planners began to see the beginnings of friction between this linear approach and the emerging irregular/unconventional type warfare. Military units were no longer moving across the battlespace freeing the populace, establishing lasting security systems, and resurrecting infrastructure. Civil infrastructure and societal systems were not rebuilt, reinstated, and then transitioned to a host nation authority in the aftermath of conflict. The US military doctrinal approach was being challenged, but too few saw it as anything of concern. This was *irregular* warfare, an aberration. Don't overreact and rethink existing doctrine. What worked in the WWII will work anywhere under similar conditions, thought some planners.

As military planners and civilian strategists would later realize, operations occur both *simultaneously* and *nonsequentially* and not always chronologically and sequentially.⁸ In the following sections, we'll explore historical examples of CMO occurring wherever and whenever required, and without any regard for whether it was pre-planned or not.

The Early Military Strategists. Although the term CMO was not used by any of the early military strategists, some PME institution faculty members believe that Clausewitz's concept of *Operational Art* did address and provide for what is known today as post-conflict operations. Considering the campaign nature of these operations, where the armed forces are required to execute noncombat tasks and activities in support of strategic objectives, they asserted that his principles and tenets remain valid. The majority of their colleagues, however, did not share this view. Early armies, they argue, were not concerned with cleaning up the aftermath and rebuilding infrastructure. Differing opinions thus exist on how CMO might be addressed when studying the writings of these early strategists.

Mexico, 1846–1848. In 1848, during the US Army’s Vera Cruz occupation, BG William Worth derived a model for administering the civilian sector charged to him following hostilities. Without any existing doctrine, he envisioned a strategy separating the civil functions into six (6) areas: fiscal affairs, public works, public health, public safety, legal affairs and education.

Philippines, 1889–1903. Of the US military examples of operations requiring major CMO to influence overall campaign success, perhaps the US Army’s experience in the Philippines provides the most varied examples. After linear, European-style operations had appeared to quiet the insurrection, a new phase emerged: guerrilla insurgency. At the time, the prevailing doctrine was Euro-centric, i.e., based on a conventional opponent using similar tactics. Following the conventional combat phase and imposition of martial law, Major General Elwell S. Otis was appointed the Military Governor. Realizing that local dynamic situations and conditions required tailored solutions, Major General Otis encouraged and permitted creative civil affairs operations suited for each locality. The degree to which his focus changed while conducting CMO is summarized here:

At the close of his 1st year as Military Governor, GEN Otis wearily noted that his Civil Affairs/Military Government responsibilities consumed more of his resources than did the actual fighting. ... The experience of the past year has conclusively demonstrated that the labor demanded to organize, supply, command, and exchange an Army actively engaged in hostilities are small in comparison to those which are required to supervise the business, social and political interests and the individual rights of several million of people.⁹

WWI, 1914–1919. Following the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 ending World War I in Germany, US Armed Forces found themselves in occupation duty, in charge of millions of civilians.

The US Army and government had not really accepted the administration of civil government in occupied enemy territory as a legitimate military function after the Mexican War, Civil War, or Spanish-American War, and the officer in charge of civil affairs for the US military government in the Rhineland after World War I lamented that the American army of occupation “lacked both training and organization” to perform its duties.¹⁰

Just as expected, clarity and vision did appear following the war when the US Army War College (USAWC) included civil affairs as

a subject area within the G-1 (Personnel) and War Plans Division Course in 1919. Civil Affairs remained in the curriculum until the US entered WWII. In 1925, the USAWC reinstituted civil affairs as a curriculum component of the G-1 section.

The Army, now aware from its Rhineland Military Government experience that there was a need for Civil Affairs sections in its war plans, made such planning a part of the War Plans Course.¹¹

WWII, 1941–1945. The inter-war period provided military planners and strategists the time to ponder civil issues requiring military support and *vice versa*. The lessons of WWI and the Philippines provided an excellent foundation for understanding CMO required during post-conflict operations. This research and analysis served as an epiphany to some; doctrine had finally emerged.

As WWII approached, Army War College committees went back to the WWI reports and developed formal doctrine for military government. In the spring of 1942, a School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, and thinking began about postwar reconstructions of Germany, Japan, and Italy.¹²

As Operation OVERLORD unfolded across the beaches of Normandy, the supporting operations concerned with restoring civil infrastructure, societal institutions, and rule of law in the wake of death and destruction were just beginning. These tasks and activities were referred to at the time as either *Civil Affairs* or *Military Government*,¹³ depending on the particular activity under discussion. Both are now doctrinally considered supporting missions of CMO. Using Operation OVERLORD as an example, allied military forces might have easily won the war but lost the ensuing peace without CMO. Military Government also applies to civilians, but specifically to the implementation of the rule of law at every level by an occupying martial authority. This is martial law and the point where the Army term *stability and support operations* enters the picture to describe the overall ground-related activities normally occurring post-conflict. For a more detailed explanation, see US Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations.¹⁴

But skepticism was still looming among key cabinet advisors regarding the involvement of other agencies of the US Government (USG). President Franklin D. Roosevelt even studied the issue and

believed CA/MG were civilian matters and therefore should be under the Department of State (DoS). His Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, however, did not agree.

Stimson tried to point out that no one could tell how long hostilities or any post-hostilities period of unrest might continue and that it would take soldiers to deal with these conditions over the long run.¹⁵

Korea, 1951–1953. Using the civil affairs tenets and principles derived from its WWII occupation, the US Army in Korea again validated the need for addressing and preparing for civil affairs.

Analysis of the missions of civil affairs indicated:

- The need to negotiate civil affairs agreements during the early stages of conflict, providing those controls over the internal affairs of the combat areas that are necessary to attain the military and political objectives
- The inseparability of military command and civil affairs responsibilities, and the importance of both a single focus of responsibility within the Army for all civil affairs functions, and a single point of contact within the Army for relationships with governments of the operational areas
- The need for officers qualified in civil affairs functions, including officers skilled in the language of the area
- The need to alert commanders and other military personnel to the importance of civil affairs in attaining military and political objectives¹⁶

Vietnam, 1962–1974. From the previous examples and vignettes, and from ad hoc guidance to newly formulated principles and doctrine, the uniqueness of CMO across the battlefield was tested in Vietnam. The functions of the DoD and the DoS, both focusing on specific civilian aspects of the campaign were on a collision course. This collision of thought precipitated a new shape and function. The necessity to link two separate and distinct programs (one military, one civilian) produced the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Program, a military program actually residing within the DoS.¹⁷ This innovative and successful program produced not only an active, engaging, and meaningful CMO program supporting the Vietnamese populace but also served to support the overall campaign plans of the USG and that of the Republic of Vietnam. Initially viewed as two unrelated programs, it took President Lyndon John-

son's direction to make it work. The unique aspect of this program was that DoS and DoD were linked and focused on the same task. Instead of having two separate elements, the CORDS Program used a combined civil-military organization to focus on the holistic, synergistic effort required. The CORDS Program, initially run by former Ambassador Robert Komer, resided structurally within the MACV but reported directly to President Johnson. As conditions and situations surfaced requiring military resources and security, the MACV commander provided them.¹⁸

Panama, 1989. Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY provided special operations planners with a chance to prove how advanced planning for CMO across all phases can insure mission success.

In the face of extensive looting and violence in downtown Panama City, [GEN Maxwell R.] Thurman predicted a complete breakdown in law, order, and public safety unless he took immediate actions. As soon as the Endara [Guillermo Endara Galimany] government could provide Panamanian personnel, they would be integrated into the operation. ... Regular combat with PDF elements wound down during the next four days, but the need to deal with remnants of the PDF¹⁹ and to conduct civil-military operations increased. ... GEN Thurman created a CMOTF²⁰ combining some of his own troops [USSOUTHCOM] and those of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion ... and 300 reservists who would follow over the next three weeks. ... The first stage of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY concentrated on public safety, health, and population control measures. Later, the US country team and the new Panamanian government took responsibility for population control, rebuilding commerce, winning the support of the people for reforms, and restructuring the PDF into separate police, customs, and defense organizations. ... From 26 Dec to 3 Jan, Civil Affairs and Special Forces troops helped distribute 1,600 tons of food ... and 218 tons of medical supplies. They also organized a camp at Balboa for nearly 5000 persons displaced by the fighting.²¹

Kuwait, 1991. Operation DESERT STORM provided a unique example of how a vision for CMO can support a campaign. This one, however, did not commence with a commander's vision.

A combined and interagency task force called the Kuwait Task Force ... did provide the needed direction and assistance for the reconstruction of Kuwait City. However, such a task force was not conceived by CENTCOM or the military. It was an initiative by Colonel Randall Elliott, who happened to hold a position in

two separate organizations. ... senior analyst in the Near East Division of the Department of State and also the operations officer of the 352d Civil Affairs Command. Therefore he understood the interagency and multinational requirements for termination and the post-conflict situation. ... the Kuwait Task Force did prove successful, in large part because of the experience of the key individuals and the funding made available by the Kuwaiti government in exile.²²

Southern Turkey/Northern Iraq, 1991–1992. In the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, Saddam Hussein launched retaliatory attacks against his long-time enemies, the Kurds. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a joint/combined security and CMO to render life-saving humanitarian assistance/safe passage to the fleeing Kurds, began with a conventional airdrop of water and food by US European Command (USEUCOM) USAF aircraft. When it became apparent that supplies alone would not resolve the situation, President George Bush made the decision to place troops on the ground to render life-saving emergency aid and provide security. The key aspects of this operation were the time-sensitive nature of the deployment, the simple and unambiguous guidance, the conditions for end-state (Kurds returned to Iraq and a seclusion zone established to guarantee their security), and the transition and handoff to a nonmilitary entity (UN). This was straightforward combined/joint military-led humanitarian assistance operation conducted within a security umbrella. The inherent skills of the participating military units accounted for the majority of skills required for success. What surfaced as a major lesson was the need to understand and work with the many IO and NGO that arrived to conduct their operations when/where they desired.²³

Somalia, 1993. By the time US military forces entered Somalia with the sole mission to provide security for convoys providing humanitarian relief supplies, military planners knew enough about CMO to ask for their respective WARTRACE²⁴ civil affairs units. The 352 Civil Affairs Command and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed assets to provide the nucleus for the JTF civil-military operations center (CMOC) and six (6) Humanitarian Operations Centers to be located throughout the area of operations. Coordinating their actions through the CMOC, Marine and Army CA units provided security and coordinated humanitarian assistance supplies while also superbly, "... gathering information on issues that included refugee health, the

development of tribal consuls and the effects of food distribution on the local economy.”²⁵

After Action Reports and personal vignettes from soldiers assigned to the 96th CA Battalion indicated that with the few exceptions of force protection constraints, civil affairs teams and unit CMO Staff Officers were able to effect coordination and orchestrate the efforts of most of the international and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) with a synergy otherwise unattainable.²⁶

The Balkans, 1993–1999. As US Armed Forces entered the Balkans, commanders came face-to-face with CMO and the reality that all units, regardless of type, have inherent skills in supporting and conducting limited CMO. But force protection measures severely hindered many units from effecting the coordination required to execute even the simplest of CMO. Civil Affairs units, attached to conventional units and task forces, found themselves bound by the supported unit’s force protection measures. These measures required that any element leaving the garrison or camp had to be accompanied by security vehicles both front and rear. Many of these supported units failed to understand the implications of command relationships, in this case, *attachment*. Since the CA units were attached to the supported units, the supported unit had the responsibility for providing all support, including organic security. Thus, many planned CMO missions were never realized and executed due to the lack of knowledge of the supported units. This was another example of commanders not understanding that CMO is a command responsibility, not a specific unit responsibility, e.g., CA.

In 1999, the United States Institute of Peace conducted a conference with senior commanders after their deployment in the Balkans to determine how prepared they were to face a stability operation. The conclusion was that the Institutional Education System [PME] had failed to prepare them.²⁷

Haiti, 1994–1995. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, in terms of innovative approaches for CMO, was as rich as Bosnia-Herzegovina but less dangerous. But the same force protection mind set crippled the JTF Commander, MG David Meade, from acting proactively with his 10th Mountain Division (Light). BG Richard W. Potter, Jr., Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) subordinate to the JTF realized that the initiative had to be seized in restoring security in Port-au-Prince and then spread countrywide. BG Potter moved from

a static presence in Port-au-Prince to returning and restoring civil infrastructure systems throughout the major cities, power nodes, and opening lines of communication. Attaching civil affairs teams to his Special Forces teams and then deploying them to 27 cities was the first step in reading the pulse of the populace and determining what was needed, where was it needed, who had it, and what assets were available to move it there.

One notable example was *Operation Light Switch*, the restoration of limited electricity to several major population centers. His CMO Staff Officer, MAJ Mike Czaja and later MAJ Steve Meddaugh, both from the 96th CA Battalion, coordinated CMO tasks and activities with the J3-CMO of the JTF, MAJ Robin Friedman.

The successes of BG Potter's JSOTF have been captured in numerous lessons learned, after action reports, and monographs. The creative CMO approaches of the JSOTF opened the eyes of the JTF commander and staff and that of the US Atlantic Command to commence even more CMO.²⁸

Afghanistan, 2001. In the aftermath of the combat raids on Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorist training sites, US military forces began to reassemble the necessary infrastructure previously destroyed by the Taliban leadership. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM continues to provide vignettes highlighting CMO planning and its impact on the overall campaign. The following examples are testimony to the effects of CMO on the campaign.

- Central Command established a Humanitarian Assistance Working Group at its headquarters in Tampa to integrate the efforts of the coalition partners with the UN and NGOs. A liaison cell composed of representatives from the NGO InterAction, the UN Office of Humanitarian Assistance, and the UN Joint Logistics Center worked in close coordination with the J5 ... and the Deputy Commander of Central Command to present the positions of those agencies and reach mutually acceptable solutions to problems. In the operational area, a Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force with subordinate CMOs was formed.²⁹

- These principles of find-fix-and-finish are what helped us defeat the Al Qaeda and the anticoalition militants in the Bermel Valley, but what won on the larger and long-term level was getting out and engaging the local population. This was done through our CMOs and local projects completed by the members of the Coalition Joint Civil Military Task Force and other

government agencies ... as well as with the support of some nongovernment organizations. You only truly know your AO when you get out and engage the population; they only come to trust you when you do so.³⁰

– All of our PRT [provisional reconstruction teams] were task organized to suit the particular situation in a particular city, village, and district. My PRT comprised civil affairs, security, agriculture, a host nation rep, USAID, multinational elements, a CMOC, a Department of State rep, a rep from the Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior, interpreters, maintenance, military police, communications, medical, contracting, and corps of engineers.³¹

The demand for civil affairs, military police, medical, logistics, transportation, contracting, and engineer assets will continue until mission completion. This continual *drain*, assuming troop force levels remain constant, will eventually impact on other military units. This in turn, may affect their specified mission.³² The following vignette highlights the need to forecast CMO assets during the planning stage. It also presents a trend seen more and more—contracting for local services (material, services and/or labor). Whether more appropriate for education or training, the requirement still exists. In some cases, expertise is needed down to platoon/company level; hence the reason for the PRT to include contracting expertise. Waiting for the higher headquarters CMOC or CA teams to coordinate such support hinders the local, on-the-scene commander in the execution of his CMO.

Innovative ways of supplying nonstandard items must be developed. There are key downsides to using local transportation. In OEF, the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) contracted local trucks to supply the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Centers (CHLC) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Many times 30–50% of the supplies on these trucks were pilfered. Because of the light footprint, CJTF 180 did not have the assets to secure these convoys. The Afghan authorities did not have the capability to do anything about this situation either. Thus a cost of doing business was incurred. These types of situations must be anticipated. That includes better ways of obtaining civilian equipment and supplies.³³

Iraq, 2003. Examples of CMO in Iraq, as Afghanistan, are numerous and continue to surface in the news as the campaign progresses. The innovativeness and creativity of those officers and noncommissioned

officers (NCO) having to learn about CMO the hard way, i.e., without the benefit of prior PME are exemplary. But situations are sometimes too dynamic/complex to derive innovative solutions on the spot. The following vignette from the Georgia Army National Guard Newsletter, *Profiles*, is but one example.

A detachment from the 265th Engineer Group, its Engineer Civil-Military Operations cell is assigned to the active Army's 82nd Airborne Division to help rebuild Iraq. Soldiers with the detachment work the western sector of Iraq that covers more than 58,000 miles and has an estimated 1.5 million inhabitants ... These Georgia Guardsman work in the most dangerous part of Iraq, the Sunni triangle, and manage more than 3,000 construction projects totaling an estimated \$1.4 billion dollars of seized funds. ... The work ranges from small renovation projects, such as upgrading a local health clinic, to major new construction that includes a six-lane, concrete expressway bridge across the Euphrates River. Every day has its challenges, whether it's dealing with the local population or a project that's being undertaken by the CMO. When it comes to staying on top of things the soldiers of the Civil-Military Operations Cell don't wait for those challenges to come to them, they go out and interact with the populace, meet with local Iraqi government ministers and continually check the progress—on site—of the work being done. ... The frequent meetings with the government ministers and the recurring visits to the work sites happens not just because the unit needs to make sure a particular project continues to move forward, but because the unit is responsible for the money—an average of more than \$1 million dollars-a-week in project costs.³⁴

Emerging Concerns. Many interviewees having Afghanistan and/or Iraq experience observed that generally, conventional officers did not fully understand CMO and its synergistic effect on the overall campaign. They believed the US Armed Forces are not doing as much CMO as it should because of two things: security and manpower—specifically, civil affairs forces. Perceptions are that many commanders are relying on CA to do the actual work because it's their specialty. Most seem unaware that CMO is a function of command and therefore should be planned and executed by the unit having responsibility for the sector in which it operates, unless of course, it calls for specialized teams at the local or provincial governmental level, and because they usually have the most resources. CMO Staff Officers are con-

stantly asking for unit support, but there seems to be a shortage of assets.

The main hindrance to effective CMO in Iraq is simply security. Until that obstacle is eliminated or at the least controlled to a manageable level, all CMO will be limited in scope. Security in Iraq is such an issue that knowledge of what to do and how to do it may sometimes be masked by security concerns.

There are, of course, many legal constraints worth mentioning that hinder CMO and use of military assets. As seen below, some fiscal and resource tools are simply outdated. But these subject areas still must be covered either during PME or pre-deployment of SOF. And it is better suited for education than *on-the-job training*. It will be far better to provide PME up front than legal counsel after the fact. One emerging example is the *Commander's Emergency Response Program*.

The fiscal and resource tools that the commanders have available are based on decisions made in the 1980s and do not match the current operational requirements. The well-meaning Funded Transportation ... and the Denton Transportation Authority (Space Available) ... are examples.³⁵

The Funded Transportation program allows donors to petition the US Department of Defense for the transport of humanitarian goods and equipment to countries in need. It is a commodities transportation program ... [that] provides the Department of Defense the authority to conduct humanitarian assistance operations worldwide and to transport DoD nonlethal excess property and humanitarian assistance materials donated by NGO, IO, and PVO for humanitarian relief.³⁶

The Denton Program allows donors to use space available on US military cargo aircraft to transport humanitarian goods and equipment to countries in need. The Denton Program is a commodities transportation program ... jointly administered by the US Agency for International Development, the DoS, and the DoD. The Denton Amendment provides the authority for DoD to use extra space on US military cargo aircraft to transport humanitarian assistance materials donated by NGO, IO, and PVO for humanitarian relief.³⁷

Historical Trends: Looking into the Crystal Ball. During interviews, historians provided what may be the most relevant perspective of how and why the US Armed Forces came to overlook CMO as a major set of tasks. Researching and analyzing events and contexts, and then developing findings and conclusions are in their nature. Foreseeing

common threads and trends running through situations is also a developed skill that military planners and political strategists seem to overlook. It may be due to the short-term nature of their assignments. They don't appear to be assigned to positions long enough to appreciate the plights of those before them. The macro focus of historians enables deeper study, research and analysis of what transpired, the context in which it occurred, and the 2nd and 3rd order effects of events over time.

Generally, historians interviewed for this project concluded that overall, the US Armed Forces tend to think they can separate these type operations from their combat/warfighting role and give it to the Reserve Component Civil Affairs (CA) forces. But it's not a pure CA job—it's every commander's job.

A few military historians also suggested that modern Western armies generally hold one of Moltke's views—politicians get you into the fight, militaries do the fighting, and the politicians then get you out.³⁸ Someone else, other than the military, does the cleanup. It would appear that in many ways, military planners still have this mindset. But there may be a mitigating factor in all this reluctance to adequately plan for CMO. Wars today tend to be much shorter. Whether they began as deliberate plans or a developing contingency may also be a factor. Longer planning cycles would enable unit planners to learn as they worked, taking their time, doing research, and reading/studying lessons learned.

These preceding vignettes provide clear proof that CMO have been a part of US military operations, whether envisioned or not. CMO are not on the verge of disappearing; history will repeat itself. To ignore history will be doing an injustice to those US Armed Forces preparing for the next contingency.

In Chapter 3, we'll look at what, if anything, Congressional legislation, DoD Directives, and Joint and Service doctrine has to say regarding PME, CMO, and post-conflict operations.

3. Current Guidance

The Law, DoD Directives & Joint/Service Doctrine

In this chapter, we'll explore directives and guidance, specifically Congressional Law, DoD Directives, and Joint and Service doctrine. The US Armed Forces derive core and collateral tasks and activities from the general and permanent laws codified by the US Congress in Title 10 (Armed Forces) United States Code (USC)³⁹, hereafter designated as Title 10 USC. This particular Title provides direction and guidance to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Services regarding US Armed Forces.

Title 10 USC

The US Code of Laws is a consolidation and codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the USA; the Code does not include regulations issued by executive branch agencies, decisions of the Federal courts, treaties, or laws enacted by State or local governments. Title 10 USC has been enacted into positive law based on Supplement III of the 2000 edition.⁴⁰ It directs the following responsibility related to PME.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Responsibilities. Regarding PME, the CJCS is responsible for:

Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces ... and formulating policies for coordinating the military education ... of members of the armed forces.⁴¹

CJCS direction and guidance, developed and coordinated by the Joint Staff, fulfilling this Congressional requirement is referred to as the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP).⁴² Its purpose is to,

... distribute the policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for officer professional military education (PME) and joint officer professional military education (JPME) ... from pre-commissioning through G/FO levels⁴³ PME conveys general bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind ... education fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives and critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, nonlinear problems... Training focuses on the instruction

of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and tasks.⁴⁴

While it is clear that training and education are not mutually exclusive, it should be obvious that *how* to approach CMO is more a function of mental agility and conceptual thought than it is procedural, i.e., checklist or procedure-driven.

To the CMO Staff Officer, war is a finite concept having a fixed and tangible adversary. The terms of a surrender/truce are codified, where rule of law and normalcy are generally returned to a duly designated or elected authority. Worst case is *non-war* that pushes the military into unfamiliar territory and uncertainty. This unfamiliar territory/uncertainty is where additional emphasis within PME curricula needs to occur, for in the words of the OPMEP, “Joint education prepares leaders ... to think their way through uncertainty.”⁴⁵

The OPMEP

The OPMEP provides directions and guidance to the Service PME institutions in the form of Learning Areas and Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE). Additionally it establishes a council of senior level representatives having responsibility to synthesize Service requirements across all officer ranks and develop the basis for PME at each of the levels; this council is referred to as the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC). The MECC is composed of the MECC principals and a supporting MECC Working Group.⁴⁶ The Commander, USSOCOM is not considered a MECC principal, however, he may send a rep to the MECC Working Group.

How might CMO enter the OPMEP? The OPMEP provides for PME updates in two ways: *Policy Review* (conducted every 5 years, involving the Joint Staff, the Services, combatant commands, PME institutions and other affected agencies),⁴⁷ and *Curricula Review* (regularly reviewed by each Service and joint college/school to remain current, effective, and in compliance with policy guidance).⁴⁸

Based on the historical examples provided in Chapter 1 and emerging post-conflict operations concepts/doctrine from contemporary contingencies, one would think that there would be an outcry, if not a demand, for inclusion of CMO in the OPMEP. The overwhelming majority of PME institution faculty members interviewed indicated that with increasing frequency, students are arriving for PME having more and more exposure to CMO. Yet the curricula have not changed to keep pace with their experiences.⁴⁹ Some faculty members even

indicated an uneasiness about addressing these CMO tasks and activities due to their own lack of personal experience and because it was not required by the curriculum of their PME institution.

A review of each of the Learning Areas found at the five levels of PME mentioned earlier produced two salient conclusions:

- The major focus continues to be on strategic level systems and processes, campaigning, and the Service systems and capabilities.
- The focus, where applicable, on stability, support, reconstruction, and transition tasks and activities is disproportionate to combat-related tasks and activities.

This focus is changing, however, and should be noted. Each of the PME institutions is currently revising its curriculum to accommodate more post-conflict operations; these may or may not include CMO as an integral part of post-conflict operations.

The OPMEP, in fulfilling the 10 USC 153 requirements, appears to provide for a holistic PME system capable of synthesizing current and emerging educational requirements and translating them into Learning Areas used in curriculum development by the PME institutions. However, overlooking the lessons of history is one thing, omitting them while in the midst of a protracted campaign is inexcusable.

In summary, there is no reference to CMO or any of the type activities comprising CMO in the OPMEP. There is, however, sufficient broad language to *permit* PME institutions to include education on what is referred to as *Phase IV, Stabilize (Post-Conflict Operations)*, which would include stability and support, reconstruction and transition, and thus CMO depending on interpretation. Regardless, implicit in the stability and support, reconstruction and transition phases is the requirement to conduct supporting CMO at every level.⁵⁰

Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces

In 10 USC 167, the Congress directs the establishment of USSOCOM.⁵¹ Its principal function is to prepare SOF to carry out assigned missions. Implicit in that function is the task of educating and training. Insofar as education was concerned, the original drafters of this section realized it would be better and cheaper to leverage the existing Joint and Service PME institutions for general education and use the component operated, special operations-specific, qualification courses and schools to develop the hard/technical skills required of SOF.

At the time, it appeared that all aspects of PME would thus be covered by such an approach. However, as the requirement to conduct CMO, stability, support, and transition emerged in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM in April 1991, it became apparent to some interviewees that the PME institutions had not adequately prepared the conventional armed forces for such nontraditional roles.⁵²

Monitoring PME: Is that enough? Title 10 USC 167 also directs the Commander, USSOCOM to monitor PME of SOF. But is *monitoring* really enough? Does the OPMEP/MECC system permit changes when the Commander, USSOCOM, determines there is a gap/deficiency in education required of his officers? What are the options available to the Commander, USSOCOM when a determination is made that a lack of core PME in a specific area is impacting adversely on his SOF? Without his own PME institution, the Commander, USSOCOM, has only two options:

- Address the issue directly with the commandants of the PME institutions in hopes of addressing the deficiency.
- Develop and operate a USSOCOM PME course specifically addressing the areas deemed critical and affecting readiness but which have not been sufficiently addressed by the OPMEP and/or specific PME institutions or fellowships.⁵³

The OPMEP, shaped by input from the MECC discussed previously, is a consensus-based document. Although USSOCOM is a player at the working group level, it still has only one vote. And one vote in the overall scheme of the process, regardless of the importance and implications on SOF, may not have much bearing on swaying the other voting members to present it to the MECC.

National Defense Strategy (NDS)

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the USG was riveted to the reality that an overall *defense* strategy, not just military, was required. Associations with the word *defense* quickly changed from the US Armed Forces to all the agencies and organizations capable of defending the USA from foreign and domestic aggression. The intent of this strategy is provided below.

This strategy is intended to provide the President a broad range of options. These include ... stability operations that could range from peacekeeping to substantial combat action.⁵⁴

Addressing stability operations specifically, the NDS provides a focus for the military:

We'll need to train units for sustained stability operations. This will include developing ways to strengthen their language and civil-military affairs capabilities as required for specific deployments.⁵⁵

This direct reference to strengthening *civil-military affairs capabilities* implies, at a minimum, education in the form of PME. The SECDEF's intent is clear; *how* it is to be strengthened is not.

National Military Strategy (NMS)

The NMS supports the National Security Strategy and implements the 2004 NDS. In the NMS, the CJCS provides his vision for the armed forces in achieving the military objectives supporting the NDS and NSS. The references to stability operations, restoration, post-conflict activities, improving existing conditions, etc., indicate linkage to CMO.

Preventing conflict requires the capability to perform stability operations to maintain or re-establish order, promote peace and security or improve existing conditions. ... A campaign to win decisively will ... require capabilities for ... unconventional warfare, ... security, stability and post-conflict operations. ... Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating ... stability operations and significant post-conflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security. ... The Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and to conduct those operations simultaneously. At the operational level, military post-conflict operations will integrate conflict termination objectives with diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and information efforts. Joint forces will, where appropriate, synchronize and coordinate their operations and activities with international partners and nongovernmental organizations. These missions render other instruments of national power more effective and set the conditions for long-term regional stability and sustainable development.⁵⁶

The mental acumen required to continuously synthesize the *stimuli* affecting post-conflict operations is enormous. That acumen must be derived over time through a system, not *on-the-job-training*. Implicit in the NMS is the need to establish an interface with the civilian populace and civil authorities to conduct activities that set the

conditions for the eventual transfer of authority to either a duly appointed host nation authority or UN representatives. Core CMO PME and exercises would provide the basis for such knowledge, but like the NDS, there is no mention of stability operations or civil-military affairs in the OPMEP.

Transitioning from the strategic level, let's shift our focus to those DoD Directives which may influence the crafting of OPMEP Learning Areas.

DoD Directives (DoDD)

A DoD Directive is a broad policy document containing what is required by legislation, the President, or the Secretary of Defense to initiate, govern, or regulate actions or conduct by the DoD Components within their specific areas of responsibilities. DoDD establish or describe policy, ... define missions ... provide authority; and assign responsibilities. One-time tasking and assignments are not appropriate in DoD Directives.⁵⁷

Currently only two DoDDs directly relate to CMO, post-conflict operations, stability and support operations, reconstruction and transition/handoff, even though these terms are directly stated in the directive. DoDD 2000.13, Civil Affairs,⁵⁸ provides for maintaining civil affairs forces to conduct the broad range of activities required to support civil affairs missions. Regarding PME, the directive tasks Commander, USSOCOM to educate and train selected personnel in civil affairs. This task, provided below, is underway and on-track as directed.

Conduct specialized civil affairs education and individual training for assigned officers and noncommissioned officers and nonassigned DoD and non-DoD personnel.⁵⁹

The second is DoDD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.⁶⁰ Without directly mentioning the term CMO or its associated doctrinal tasks and activities, there is nonetheless clear linkage throughout the document. In summary, the vast majority of the tasks and activities depicted in this new DoDD, regardless of how worded, have been within the CMO and Civil Affairs / Military Government doctrine for years. There is nothing new in this DoDD that practitioners of Civil Affairs / Military Government in post WWII Germany and Japan, previously mentioned, did not experience during the implementation

of the Marshall Plan and the occupation of Japan. Perhaps it is a sad commentary on the crafters of this DoDD, attempting to categorize tasks and activities within a certain linear phase, than it is on military doctrine writers and practitioners of CMO who fully realize that it must occur without regard for phases or any other man-made metric. Had the writers of this DoDD received core CMO PME it would have been the perfect opportunity to state that CMO are a vital part of stability operations but occur throughout all phases.

But there is positive side to this DoDD. It provides Commander, USSOCOM the opportunity to finally address many of the special operations-related PME deficiencies that existed before. In the tasks section of the DoDD, the Chairman, JCS is tasked to develop curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for the conduct and support of stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments *and the Commander, USSOCOM*. Further, Commander, USSOCOM is tasked to appoint a senior officer to lead stability operations initiatives; develop stability operations capabilities; ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and service schools prepare personnel for stability operations; ensure CA and PSYOP programs develop the quantity and quality of personnel needed for stability operations; support stability operations joint concept development, experimentation, and capability development; ensure research, development, and acquisition programs address stability operations capabilities and are integrated, in coordination with the USD(AT&L); support interagency requests for personnel and assistance to bolster the capabilities of US Departments and Agencies to prepare for and conduct stability operations as appropriate, in coordination with the USD(P); and develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.11.1 through 5.11.8, in coordination with the USD(P).

Joint Doctrine

Within the DoD, the Joint Staff orchestrates and de-conflicts emerging Service concepts into joint doctrine reflecting the Congress' and SECDEF's guidance and direction.⁶¹

Although joint doctrine currently exists for civil-military operations (Joint Publication 3-57, discussed below) and civil affairs (Joint Publication 3-57.1, discussed below), and a Service manual (Army Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations),

Neither Joint nor Army doctrine contains any principles for conducting civil-military operations ... the civil-military operations center (CMOC) is discussed in the staff responsibility section of the G-5 but CMO is not addressed in the body of the document. CMO is not identified as a commander's responsibility and part of the integral fabric of full spectrum operations.⁶²

Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, Joint Pub 3-57. The definition, scope, and types of CMO provided previously in Chapter 1 provide the best overview of CMO: *Who* directs them, *What* they encompass, *When* they can be legally conducted, *Where* they will occur, and *Why* they should occur. They should not to be confused with emerging doctrine relating to *stability and support operations, reconstruction, and/or transition*. These refer generally to the overall planning phases as previously mentioned. CMO, on the other hand, may occur across all phases simultaneously.⁶³

Joint Operations Concepts (JOC). In the JOC, the SECDEF articulates the concept for future joint military operations. The concepts and definition of stability operations found therein clearly link CMO to operations across the spectrum:

Stability operations are military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or re-establish order and promote stability.⁶⁴

Directly relating to CMO and establishing infrastructure is JOC 3.A.4., "Rapidly deploy selected portions of the Joint Force that can immediately transition to execution, even in the absence of developed infrastructure. Expeditionary capabilities ... shape the battlespace, set initial conditions to achieve strategic objectives, provide assured access, and establish the required infrastructure."⁶⁵

Service Doctrine: US Army

The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Combined Arms Center (CAC), Ft Leavenworth, KS, is now the proponent for CMO and will develop doctrine accordingly. The US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is to remain the proponent for Civil Affairs. Until CAC fulfils its responsibility and provides a CMO Staff Officer's Course, however, CA officers will continue to be assigned as unit CMO Staff Officers having only their CA Officer's Qualification Course as PME. Although many of the skills are similar, the scope of the CMO Staff Officer, as defined in Army Field Manual

101-5, is much broader. Comments from current and previous CMO Staff Officers indicate that in order for the CA Officer's Qualification Course to also fulfill requirements for CMO Staff Officers, especially at the combatant command level, approximately four weeks of instruction would have to be added.⁶⁶

US Army Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). US Army Field Manual 100-5, "Operations," dated 14 June 1993, refers to the major functions performed by the force on the battlefield as *BOS*. BOS include maneuver, fire support, air defense, *command and control*, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and *combat service support*. Since 1994 USSOCOM has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to convince the Army to incorporate CMO as an equally viable system. Now that stability operations have returned to the doctrinal lexicon, CMO-associated tasks and activities may eventually emerge as critical to the overall mission. The US Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (USAPKSOI) has concluded from its study of stability operations that,

The Army has focused its training and development on ... Maneuver, Command and Control, Fire Support, Intelligence, Air Defense, Mobility Counter-Mobility Survivability, and Combat Service Support. Two of the key "systems" for Stability Operations that do not have a home are information operations and Civil-Military Operations.⁶⁷

US Army Field Manual (FM) No. 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.

This is the Army's capstone manual for staff organization and operations of major tactical and major tactical support commands at corps level and below. It establishes responsibilities, defines the tasks within staff sections, and provides direction on developing plans and orders to execute decisions. The CMO Staff Officer is designated as a primary staff officer. However, the Army does not authorize a CMO Staff Officer below division headquarters (UEx) level. In addressing this lack of authorization, FM 101-5 states that in units having no authorization for a CMO Staff Officer the commander will appoint an officer such responsibility for civil-military operations (CMO) functions as an *additional duty*.

It is hard to imagine, in the face of the Army's rich history of conducting CMO, how the very units doing the most CMO historically (battalions and below) are authorized no CMO planners. Could this be an indication by those doctrine writers having no foundation in or historical knowledge of CMO that such a position can actually be performed as an *additional duty*? This may also be the genesis, from

a PME perspective, why many officers fail to learn about CMO and its relationship to the overall campaign. Reviewing the duties of the CMO Staff Officer reveals the obvious weakness in attempting to address this staff function as an additional duty.⁶⁸

Service Doctrine: US Marine Corps

In MCWP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations, the Marine Corps provides clear and succinct guidance as to why CMO will be conducted.⁶⁹ It is also the only publication providing a set of CMO planning principles. Not only are these worth mentioning, but also worthy of inclusion in core PME.⁷⁰ Although the USMC has such a doctrinal manual, it neither includes CMO as a Learning Area in core PME nor operates a CMO course.

4. Views from the Field

Independent Studies

A number of independent studies focusing on various aspects of post-conflict operations either have been concluded or are still underway. Most address education and training in general terms, but nothing specifically CMO in nature. The following studies, however, directly relate to PME, and to CMO specifically.

Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities. The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the SECDEF; its statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations do not represent the official position of DoD.⁷¹ This study produced several findings relating directly to CMO and civil affairs operations:⁷²

Stabilization and reconstruction should become a core competency ... through ... leader development, doctrine development, and other tools DOD applies to serious missions. The service secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff should integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into the services' professional military education programs.⁷³

Reconstruction [and nation-building⁷⁵] calls for a myriad of competencies: humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil administration, and media.⁷⁶

Stability forces need to be able to attend to humanitarian concerns and make initial infrastructure repairs and deal with civil emergencies and related government issues.⁷⁶

S&R planning can require expertise in Infrastructure, Public Health, Civil Administration, Governance, Economic development, Humanitarian assistance, and Media.⁷⁷

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N), a three-phased effort to explore the next era of defense reform, has as its primary goal the development of an integrated set of practical and actionable recommended reforms for organizing both the US military and national security apparatus to meet 21st century challenges.⁷⁸

The Phase 1 Final Report, released in March 2004, contained this conclusion:⁷⁹

... the Iraq war has served to remind us that post-conflict reconstruction operations are an inherent part of warfare. However “decisive” the combat phase of a war, it will invariably stop short of achieving our broader strategic objectives. ... decisive military operations may be necessary to achieve our objectives, but they are rarely if ever sufficient. To get to the final goal, one needs follow-on civil-military operations to win the peace.⁸⁰

The Phase 2 Final Report, released 28 July 2005, identified two specific trends requiring correction by PME reform:

1. *Lack of activity Integration.* “... there is no standard approach to fully integrating the activities of military forces and civilian agencies on the ground. To the contrary, an examination of the coordination mechanisms used in operations ranging from Haiti and Bosnia during the Clinton administration to Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush administration suggests that US civilian and military leaders tend to develop new approaches in each operation. These *ad hoc*, often personality-driven approaches too often ignore the experience gleaned from previous operations.”⁸¹
2. *Military neither trained nor equipped for post-conflict operations.* “With the exception of civil affairs units that are specifically trained for reconstruction work, the US military is not adequately trained or equipped to build civil administrations, act as mayors of villages, establish national financial systems, rebuild health and sanitation infrastructures, instigate judicial reform, hold elections, and so on.”⁸²

Summarizing all previous PME-related observations, findings, conclusions and recommendations, the Phase 2 Final Report provided a conclusion relating to the very heart of this monograph and what should be the essence of PME:

Education that does not equip personnel to operate in a world of multinational and interagency operations ... does not provide a useful service to its students or the nation.⁸³

US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute Report, “Stabilization Operations: Where We Are And The Road Ahead.” This study followed a December 2004 symposium on stability operations sponsored by the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (USAPK-SOI), DoS’ Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and

the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). It focused on PME, civilian education and training development, operational lessons learned with emphasis on improving civil-military planning and execution, and identifying civilian and military capability gaps.⁸⁴

Central to the study's theme was the challenges confronting the USG in stability operations.⁸⁵ Panel discussions and presentations posited further evidence that curricula in the PME institutions could be improved in the area of stability operations.

Among the responses offered were making more relevant the curriculum in the military education system ...⁸⁶

Interviews: Rants & Raves

With historical examples of CMO, Title 10 USC responsibilities, DoDD, joint and Service doctrine, and independent study findings/recommendations providing the basis for PME reform, we'll now transition to candid comments and observations from the field—those officers and civilians studying, teaching, researching, analyzing and executing CMO. What do they think about the lack of CMO in core PME curricula? What do those senior officials charged with planning, orchestrating support for, and directing stability and support operations and their inherent CMO think about PME? Are the PME institutions able to adapt to the realization that the tasks and activities normally associated with CMO and occurring across stability, support, reconstruction, and transition are as key as the kinetic, combat tasks found in *Phase II—Dominate*?

Participating respondents were asked many questions related to post-conflict operations, CMO, stability and support, curriculum design, the OPMEP, feedback from PME institution students and graduates, lessons learned, personal experience, etc. As expected, responses spanned the spectrum of awareness, ranging from *What's CMO?* to *Completely Aware* (former CMO Staff Officers).⁸⁷

The interviews produced data which can generally be grouped into the following categories: Leader Mindset, PME Institution Atmosphere, the OPMEP Process, Student and Graduate Experience, Critical Expertise Required for CMO, the Information Gathering: The Collateral Benefits of CMO, and finally a Grassroots Success Story.

Leader Mindset: Emphasis on Kinetic versus Nonkinetic Tasks. The lack of core CMO knowledge appears to go well beyond the US Armed Forces. In respondents' opinions, there is still no acceptance by some

senior, civilian officials that the post-conflict phase is as important as previous phases. Many senior officials exhibit the attitude that someone else takes over after the warriors. This ignorance of what military and nonmilitary organizations and agencies can do was surprising. And if this ignorance exists at the highest levels of DoD, is it not understandable why CMO has been omitted from core PME?

Consensus among respondents indicates that CMO occurring during the post-conflict phases require a different thought process, more of the *How to think* previously described as opposed to *What to think/What to do*. Interviewees knew that CMO provide countless opportunities for creativity and innovative approaches. It is the unit commander's vision of end-state, however, that is important; the entire chain of command will see it if he can see it. But commanders must instill in their subordinates that the post-conflict phases are as important as the *Dominate* phase.

Conventional militaries understand Operational Art as postulated by Clausewitz,⁸⁸ but that ends at the conclusion of *Phase III—Dominate*, say some interviewees. Commanders are sometimes risk averse and aren't inclined to undertake CMO because they are not specifically stated in plans/orders from higher. Some respondents witnessed an unwillingness and lack of knowledge to fill any vacuum caused by a lack of guidance from higher headquarters. They posited that this lack of guidance from higher emanates directly from a lack of PME, particularly in CMO.

Other respondents preferred to summarize this same perception in a different manner. If our leaders, both military and civilian, believe it is not important, then we probably will not do it. *How* we plan to fight is a function of the assumptions we make up front based on guidance. We can plan for anything, as long as we know up front what our masters want. However, when senior leadership cannot determine the extent of military participation and provide a vision for campaign conclusion, then a void develops.

Some blame this perceived reluctance to undertaking CMO or post-conflict operations, *non-warrior-like* tasks on the military's *warrior ethos*, i.e., warriors do warrior-like tasks; non-warriors do non-warrior tasks. Some believe the PME institutions focus so much on the *warfighting* aspects that one cannot help but feel anything else is unimportant.

PME Institution Restrictions. Current and former PME institution faculty members indicated their curriculum were tight, i.e., any new and improved idea would become a wedge. And when inserted, some other *core* subject would either be pushed aside or the institution

would have to accommodate it either by extending the school day or the curriculum length/school year; extending both are very sensitive issues. Paraphrasing these faculty members, it would appear there is something *sacred* about PME course length, which mandates that no matter what is required by whatever body of thinkers, it shall not exceed a specified length. Why isn't it the other way around? Shouldn't the requirements drive course length?

Adapting PME Curriculum at Glacial Speed. Most faculty members are aware that the OPMEP is the driving force behind PME curricula development; each PME institution commandant has the authority and responsibility to adjust the curriculum depending on his assessment of what is *being* taught, what *should* be taught, and *how* this knowledge is being assessed and exercised. The process of developing the OPMEP through consensus may not be the best method, but it appears to be the only viable method of collating input from the participating representatives discussed earlier. But this process is too slow to respond, regardless of the reasons.

Historians and faculty members were asked whether they believed the OPMEP process hindered adding emerging topics deemed critical by the commandant and curriculum committee. Several interviewees were very quick to point out that by looking at current curricula, you would not know we are a nation at war! Not surprisingly, the respondents adamantly favoring the addition of CMO to core PME tended to be those having recent operational experience. Particularly at the MEL-4 level, it was not uncommon to hear that the PME institution is behind the times. Said some, this school moves at glacial speed when directed to add or amend something; and it's always a knee-jerk reaction and sudden change—not very well thought out. We have become a procedures school, e.g., Standing Operating Procedures, formats, checklists, templates, etc. A lot of the *how to think* has been deleted in *lieu* of actual training. We should reduce the repetitive task training, e.g., writing annexes, and use that time more wisely studying concepts, history, and principles. We have very smart faculty members, but we are slow to change in order to meet the intellectual needs of these students, particularly the ones having just returned from Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. It's business as usual.

Don't Forget the Nonresident Students! To this point we have addressed core PME in general terms, i.e., the reader probably concludes that PME is PME, whether it refers to resident or nonresident students.

But there is a clear distinction between resident PME curricula and nonresident. Those students selected for nonresident PME are faced with two different kinds of challenges altogether. First, resident PME facilitates full-time focus, i.e., students attend on a full-time basis. Nonresident students, however, must maintain their full-time positions while attempting to dedicate as much time as possible to the nonresident PME program. Most students would probably conclude that both curricula are the same since it is from the same PME institution. Were CMO to be addressed in the core curriculum, then nonresident students would receive it in nonresident curriculum. This is not the case, however, for each of the PME institutions. At the SSC level, for example, nonresident curricula may or may not coincide with the resident curricula due to various rationale; most nonresident faculty members say the differences are due to how the courses are administered, i.e., via the internet. Lessons could not exceed a specified size and function when delivered from a server. Band-width also prohibited many taped lectures and video clips used by the resident courses.

Student & Graduate Experience. Most faculty members indicated that whether or not the curriculum included CMO and post-conflict operations, the student body as a whole was being *exposed* to it during seminar discussions/presentations. These discussions resulted not so much from faculty instructor-driven, Socratic-based *Learning Areas or Points To Consider*, but from the discussions of student experiences in Panama, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Although a component of seminar learning is sharing experiences, the degree of experience differs from seminar to seminar based on the composition of that particular seminar. Thus, they believed, there must be a standardized CMO Learning Area incorporated into the curricula.

Critical Expertise required for CMO. When asked about the particular skills critical to planning and conducting effective CMO, most respondents listed cultural awareness, cross-cultural communications skills, negotiations, and knowledge of the local language; planning, orchestrating, and de-conflicting CMO seemed dependent on such expertise. When asked whether they believed these same type skills might be duplicated by conventional forces as opposed to SOF, many stated that although the concept sounded logical, it would probably require too many years and too much money to make it happen. Most respondents understood the perishable nature of foreign lan-

guage skills and that regional orientation and cultural awareness were not as perishable. It should not be surprising to the reader that the majority of the respondents believed the best forces for effecting any interface with the local populace and leaders were SOF. One NGO executive emphasized how well SOF can provide that presence so desperately needed at the local neighborhood level; not the job for conventional forces. They don't seem to be comfortable doing it and it shows. We [NGO] notice it and all the locals notice it as well.⁸⁹

Information Gathering: The Collateral Benefits of CMO. One of the benefits of interacting with the local populace during CMO is the ability to passively gather information; such information may or may not eventually be processed into intelligence; each interview produced this observation. The very nature of CMO opens avenues to information that might otherwise be closed. The following vignette is indicative of the many ways military forces gain access during the normal course of conducting CMO.

The way ahead is simple: focus some of our doctrine and training to prepare young company commanders to lead combined-arms warfare, to conduct CMO, and to develop and exploit their own intelligence. ... We met with elders from every village in the Bermel Valley, drank *chai* ... and discussed village problems and how to arrive at joint solutions. We provided humanitarian assistance and *di-minimus* [sic] health care (defined as small-scale medical assistance operations using available excess medical supplies) to the population. We laid the groundwork to build wells, hospitals and schools—including the first ever girls' school in the region. We met routinely with the Pakistani Border Commander ... to discuss cross-border issues and co-operation. ... And the unified effort of engaging the population in CMOs led directly to most of the intelligence we collected—intelligence that saved my life and my soldiers' lives. ... none of my formal military training focused on such scenarios.”⁹⁰

Unencumbered by the OPMEP: A Grassroots Success Story. By far the most comprehensive CMO education in PME is currently found in the US Army Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It is incorporated as part of the general SOF strategic and operational overviews presented in the core curriculum. It also resides within a separate SOF track developed and coordinated by the Special Operations Faculty Instructors comprising the Special Operations Element of the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations. At the heart of this SOF-track is a

focus on special operations PME for Army special operations officers: Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Operations Aviation, and Rangers. These officers, in addition to attending and completing the regular core CGSC curriculum and requirements, must also undertake special operations subjects tailored for their specific specialty. In regards to CMO, the CA students receive CMO in their Advanced Civil Affairs track and other selected lessons (about 26 more hours than do the SF and PSYOP students who also receive some). Some students are writing papers on CMO, some on CA. The SOF track core curriculum also covers key Service capabilities to support CMO, e.g., USAF Prime Beef, Harvest Falcon, Harvest Eagle, Rapid Runway Repair, and Red Horse units; US Navy construction battalions and medical ships; and US Marine Corps construction battalions. The linkage between SOF skills involving coordination w/civilians is very important and emphasized throughout the curriculum.

What is so remarkable about this unique continuing Special Operations PME is that it was not produced as a result of any Title 10 USC, DoDD, Joint or Service directive. It began as a grassroots vision by the Special Operations Faculty Instructors within the Special Operations Element of the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusion #1: SOF are not receiving CMO education in core PME. Commander, USSOCOM, has both the authority and responsibility to provide SOF PME.

Recommendation: For Resident PME (all ranks), develop a mandatory CMO Course in the spirit of CGSC ILE. For Nonresident PME (officer and NCO), develop a web-based CMO Course. Grant access to all SOF for continuing PME.

Conclusion #2: The skills and functions required of CMO Staff Officers are not sufficiently included the CA Officer's Qualification Course.

Recommendation: Include the critical skills and functions required of the CMO Staff Officer in the CA Officer's Qualification Course.

Conclusion #3: The lack of CMO education impacts on USSOCOM (specifically SF, CA, and PSYOP) who are continually requested to deploy to plan, orchestrate, conduct and support CMO due to their inherent specialty skills (area and cultural orientation, language proficiency, and cross-cultural communications).

Recommendation: Seek inclusion of CMO as core PME subject in order to educate conventional forces that CMO is a command function. This will lessen the requirement to provide SOF to plan and execute CMO for many units.

Consider the impact/value of SOF in post-conflict operations as mentioned in the *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*.

The J-5 of one combatant command put it to us very succinctly: "For each of my high-priority countries, I need a good foreign area officer, a civilian staff member who has been working the country for years, and an experienced special operator." Few combatant command staffs have that depth of expertise.⁹¹

Endnotes

1. National Defense University, "Beyond Jointness: Civil-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance," symposium report (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, January 2000), 1.
2. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1992), 3.
3. David L. Buffaloe, "Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82d Airborne in Firebase Shkin," *The Institute of Land Warfare* (October 2004): 18.
4. These include officers serving in the following operational career paths/specialties/ratings: Army civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces, rangers, and special operations aviation; Naval special warfare ratings; and Air Force special operations specialty designations.
5. US Department of Defense, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February 2001), vii.
6. US Department of Defense, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, viii-ix.
7. US Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning*, Revision Third Draft (3), Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 August 2005), IV-31.
8. Without exception, every historian interviewed stated this should have been evident all along. But at the time military planners were still adhering to the European-influenced warfare doctrine and readings.
9. Stanley Sandler, *Glad To See Them Come and Sorry To See Them Go: A History of US Army Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*, (Fort Bragg, N.C.: United States Army Special Operations Command, 1998), 116.
10. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003), 13.
11. Sandler, 167.
12. Crane and Terrill, 15.
13. Civil Affairs refers to those affairs of a civilian populace which must be addressed by military commanders in an operation that require attention and support in order the further the goals of the overall campaign plan. Military Government refers to the administration of civilian infrastructure and societal-related support systems until a duly-elected or appointed authority assumes control.
14. "Stability operations and support operations are not new to the Army. From the start of American history, the government has called on its armed forces to pursue US strategy. The Army, as an instrument of national power, promoted and protected national interests, and relieved

human suffering. The Army helped open the West...conducted explorations, governed territories, guarded national parks, made maps, and built roads and canals ... provided disaster relief, quieted domestic disturbances, and supported American foreign policy (for example, conducting stability operations in the Philippines from 1899–1904 and Haiti from 1915–1934). While many of these operations occurred during peacetime, what the Army now calls stability operations and support operations emerged during the 20th century as a major contributor to the overall success of combat operations. During World War II, for example, US forces assisted the local governments and populace in reconstructing the civil infrastructures of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. They fed starving civilians, rebuilt bridges and roads, and de-mined extensive tracts of farmland while full-scale combat operations continued to take place against conventional enemies. During the Vietnam conflict, Army units conducted *pacification*, which involved civil-military operations such as assistance to civil authorities for security and administration. The Army has repeatedly been called to respond to the nation's requirements, both at home and overseas." US Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (FM 100-20) (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Army, 20 February 2003), 3.

15. Sandler, 172.
16. Darwin C. Stolzenbach and Henry A. Kissinger, *Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-1951*, Working Paper (Chevy Chase, Md.: Johns Hopkins University, August 1952), p. 67.
17. The CORDS Program was the MACV advisory effort to the government of Viet Nam's pacification program. It was essentially the CMO aspect of the Viet Nam conflict. In today's doctrinal terms, the CORDS Program was joint with all Service components represented. CORDS also had a large civilian component.
18. In January 1970, the word "Revolutionary" was changed to "Rural."
19. Panama Defense Forces
20. civil-military operations task force
21. Ronald H. Cole, "Joint Campaign Planning" (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, VIII, February 2005), 13-15.
22. William J. Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," *Parameters* XXXIII, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 110.
23. And of course they were entirely correct. At the time of US Armed Forces deployment, the UN had not officially sanctioned and designated the operation for support. The UN neither requested nor selected the US to enter the conflict. It began as a unilateral US operation and eventually evolved into a multinational operation incorporating the assets and expertise of participating nations also there on their own under the leadership and advice of the US Once security was established and emergency medical aid administered, the UN was able to energize its systems and agencies and assume the role of sponsorship. The lessons derived from this CMO were not the validated use

of medical, communications, logistics, SOF, and other military assets but the growing need to understand and work with the many IO and NGO. This friction and fog remains today one of the hardest aspects of CMO. The author, serving as the Deputy J3, Joint Task Force Alpha, witnessed many members of these organizations say, *Who put you in charge, America? This is not your land. We're here to help also. We'll go where we want, when we want, and do what we want within our charters—we work for our benefactors, not for any military force.*

24. In accordance with US Army Regulation 30-1, The Army WARTRACE Program, RC units are to be apportioned to AC units in support of Warplans. This apportionment insured that RC units knew of their wartime tasks and facilitated training relationships with the wartime supported units.
25. Adam B. Siegel, "45 Intelligence Challenges of Civil-Military Operations," *Military Review*, September–October 2001 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/English/SepOct01/siegle.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 September 2005.
26. The author, serving as the Battalion Commander, 96th CA Battalion (Airborne), received Situation Reports, phone calls and conducted interviews and debriefs from returning forces soldiers during the period May–December 1993.
27. William J. Flavin, "Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations" (point paper, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 30 May 2005), 4.
28. This operation was unique in a number of aspects. First, it was initially planned as a combat assault. The extent of post-conflict CMO activities authorized, as stated by ADM Paul David Miller, Commander in Chief, USACOM, was "to restore the country to D-1 standards. US Armed Forces would not, under any circumstances, conduct nation-building." Secondly, when the operation changed to become an unopposed landing, stability and support became the primary missions. Upon deployment, there was no enemy force, no shots fired, and no collateral damaged due to combat. So, what began initially as *Only do enough CMO to restore the country to D-1 standards* later became *We're not sure what we want you to do, but don't screw it up!*
29. Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," 106.
30. Buffalo, 4.
31. LTC Charles L. Westover, US Army Reserve, interview by author, 21 April 2005, Seattle, WA.
32. It is interesting to note that during research for this project interviewees often used the term *drain* when referring to using their organic assets to support CMO. Perhaps this is the best indicator of all that PME is needed to emphasize proper CMO planning so required assets are apportioned to support CMO and thus not dual-tasked.
33. Flavin, "Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations," 17.

34. *Profiles, the Georgia National Guard Home Page*; available from http://www.dod.state.ga.us/profiles/265th_Eng_Grp-b-feb_13_%2004.html; Internet; accessed 13 September 2005.
35. Flavin, "Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations," 9.
36. This authority provides for the actual cost of commercial transportation and the payment of any associated DoD administrative costs incurred. The DoD administers the Funded Transportation Program. Guidelines: While the statutory authority permits transportation via any mode and for any cargo that could be defined as humanitarian assistance materials, the DoD and the Department of State (DOS) have established policies that impose limits on the program due to the austere level of funding made available. These policies are: Transport is limited only to surface modes -- funded airlift is reserved only for emergency (declared disaster) situations. Cargo is limited only to that which addresses basic humanitarian needs (e.g., medical, food, shelter, and clothing). Minimum cargo restrictions -- to use this program, the minimum cargo size is one 20 - foot shipping container (or 1100 cubic feet equivalent). Before gathering supplies, donors should first contact the DoD Funded Transportation Program Manager to determine whether the program is possible in the specific country. US Department of Defense, *About the Funded Transportation Program*, available at <http://www.dentonfunded.com/AboutFT.htm>, internet; accessed 13 September 2005.
37. Since the Denton Program is a space available program, it is impossible to predict when transportation will be provided; therefore, no guarantees can be made regarding completion of a shipment. Guidelines: The Denton program offers free transportation only on a Space Available basis. It cannot be undertaken at any cost to the USG other than the cost of the transportation itself. USAID Home Page, *Overview of the Denton Application Process*, available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/dentonguidelines.html; Internet; accessed 13 September 2005.
38. Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke (October 26, 1800 - April 24, 1891), who became Helmuth, Graf von Moltke in 1870, was a famous German Field Marshal. Influenced by Clausewitz, his main thesis was that military strategy had to be understood as a system of options since only the beginning of a military operation was plannable. As a result, he considered the main task of military leaders to consist in the extensive preparation of all possible outcomes. His thesis can be summed up by two statements, one famous and one less so, translated into English as "No battle plan survives contact with the enemy," and "War is a matter of expedients." *Helmuth von Moltke the Elder*, available from http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Helmuth_von_Moltke_the_Elder; Internet; accessed 15 September 2005.
39. The Code of Laws of the United States of America, Latest edition: 2000, Supplement 1, 22 January 2002.
40. 19 January 2004
41. *Armed Forces*, US Code, vol. 10, sec. 153 (2002).

42. US Department of Defense, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 August 2004).
43. military Service academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps units, and Federal and State Officer Candidate Schools and Officer Training Schools; abbreviation for General/Flag Officer
44. US Department of Defense, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-1 thru A-2.
45. Ibid., A-A-2.
46. The MECC Principals include the Deputy Director, Joint Staff for Military Education; the presidents, commandants and directors of the joint and Service universities and colleges; and the heads of any other JPME-certified or accredited institutions; and the USJFCOM J-7. The MECC Working Group comprises Dean's-level/O-6 representatives of the MECC principals. Service chiefs and combatant commanders are invited to send participants to all MECC Working Group meetings to provide feedback to improve the educational process. From US Department of Defense, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 August 2004), C-1.
47. Ibid., C-2.
48. Ibid., C-3.
49. PME institution faculty instructors and historians, interviews by author, December 2004 through July 2005, multiple locations.
50. The *Primary* level of PME has no Learning Area covering tasks and activities beyond combat, yet the majority of stability and support, reconstruction and transition/CMO tasks and activities are conducted by the smallest units on the ground—squads, platoons and companies. Success or failure of these village-level CMO are largely dependent on the abilities of these young officers to assess the situation and derive conclusions about what will work, what can be supported, and what the desired outcome is to be. But this requires an understanding of CMO and how they fit into the overall campaign.
51. *Armed Forces*, US Code, vol. 10, sec. 167 (2002).
52. "SOF's diverse talents made it a natural choice to support humanitarian assistance efforts. Perhaps the best example of SOF's capabilities to deal with a large scale disaster was Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. At the end of DESERT STORM, in February 1991, Iraqi Kurds revolted against Saddam Hussein, but his forces quickly crushed the rebellion. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled to the mountains in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. In April 1991, USEUCOM initiated Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to stop further Iraqi attacks and to establish a safe haven for the Kurds. On short notice, MC-130Es led in other aircraft to drop emergency supplies to the Kurdish refugees in the mountains of Iraq and Turkey. Next, Special Forces personnel, supported by MH-53J helicopters, located suitable sites for refugee camps and worked with refugee leaders to organize and distribute supplies to the populace. Civil Affairs units developed plans

for medical assistance, food distribution, and daily camp operations, and then managed their implementation. Joint SOF medical teams provided medical assistance and training, such as camp sanitation, and were instrumental in dramatically reducing the death rate. SEAL and Special Boat Unit personnel provided medical support and security in camps. Psychological Operations forces supported efforts to end chaotic conditions by producing millions of leaflets and by loud-speaker presentations. Their efforts also helped to convince the Kurds to return to their homes. SOF were credited with saving thousands of lives by providing skilled personnel to rebuild the civil infrastructure, establish supply networks, and furnish medical assistance and training.” US Special Operations Command, “United States Special Operations Command History 15th Anniversary,” available from http://www.socom.mil/Docs/15th_aniversary_history.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 September 2005.

53. The majority of respondents felt that forcing a change in the current curricula of their PME institution, regardless of the technique and intent, would prove fruitless. Suggestions such as this one appeared more times than not as the best and actually only way to fix any perceived gaps/deficiencies in what the OPMEP and PME institutions provided and what Commander, USSOCOM, required.
54. US Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of Defense, March 2005), 8.
55. Ibid., 15.
56. US Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 13-14.
57. *The Washington Headquarters Services Executive Services Directorate Directives and Records Division Home Page*, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/general.html>; Internet; accessed 25 September 2005.
58. US Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: ASD (SO/LIC), 27 June 1994).
59. Ibid., 6.
60. DoDD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 28, 2005. Noteworthy in this new DoDD is the policy that “Stability operations are a core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”
61. The Joint Doctrine Branch is responsible for promoting joint doctrine awareness and managing the development of joint doctrine to improve joint, interagency, and multinational Interoperability and to enhance regional combatant command warfighting capabilities. The Joint Edu-

cation Branch is responsible for policy, programs, quality management and analysis of military education matters prescribed as CJCS responsibilities or implemented by CJCS Directive, with particular emphasis on Joint Professional Military Educating (JPME).

62. Flavin, "Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations," 2.
63. From Operation OVERLORD through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, CMO have occurred when and where commanders felt it necessary. As Allied combat units swept through Normandy liberating cities, forces designated prior to the invasion had the responsibility to conduct what was known then as civil affairs operations to assist the French in restoring, as much as legally and physically possible, civil infrastructure institutions. In Viet Nam, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) Program provided an integrated civilian-military organization to work at the grass-roots level of society in hopes of restoring hope in the minds of the populace as to the overall military effort. From Grenada, through Panama, Kuwait, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro, Haiti, and to Afghanistan and Iraq, CMO have provided the civil-military interface required to support, complement, and assist attainment of strategic objectives.
64. US Department of Defense, *Joint Operations Concepts* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 November 2003), 18.
65. *Ibid.*, 12.
66. Directly affected by this is USSOCOM, which continues to educate Functional Area 38/39, Civil Affairs officer to fill the G9/J9/CJ9 billets throughout DoD. Without proper PME this FA 38/39 will be unable to meet the full-spectrum requirements of the position, particularly at the unified combatant command, Joint Staff, Service department, and Interagency task force levels.
67. Flavin, "Key Issues Impacting Stability Operations," 16.
68. These include, but are not limited to: advising the commander of the civilian impact on military operations, advising the commander on his legal and moral obligations concerning the impact of military operations on the local populace (economic, environmental, and health) for both the short and long term, minimizing civilian interference with combat operations, to include dislocated civilian operations, curfews, and movement restrictions, advising the commander on the employment of other military units that can perform CMO missions, establishing and operating a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to maintain liaison with and coordinate the operations of other US government agencies; host nation civil and military authorities; and nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations in the area of operations, planning positive and continuous community relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding and good will, and to support military operations, coordinating with the SJA concerning advice to the commander on rules of engagement for dealing with civilians in the area of operations, providing recommended CMO-related IR and EEFI to the G2, coordinating with the G3 (FSCoord) on protected targets, providing the G2 operational infor-

mation gained from civilians in the area of operations, coordinating with the G3 (PSYOP) on trends in public opinion, coordinating with the G1 (surgeon) on the military use of civilian medical facilities, materials, and supplies, assisting the G1 with coordination for local labor resources, coordinating with the PAO and the G3 (PSYOP) to ensure disseminated information is not contradictory, coordinating with the PAO on supervising public information media under civil control, providing instruction to units or officials (friendly, or host nation civil or military) and the population in identifying, planning, and implementing programs to support the civilian populations and strengthen the host nation internal defense and development, identifying and assisting the G6 with coordination for military use of local communications systems, providing technical advice and assistance in the reorientation of enemy defectors, EPWs, and civilian internees or detainees, participating in targeting meetings, coordinating with the G3 (PM) the planning of the control of civilian traffic in the area of operations, assisting the G3 with information operations, identifying and assisting the G4 with coordination for facilities, supplies, and other material resources available from the local civil sector to support military operations, coordinating with the G1 and SJA in establishing off-limits areas and establishments, coordinating with the SJA on civilian claims against the US government, exercise Staff planning and supervision over: attached civil affairs (CA) units, military support to civil defense and civic action projects, protection of culturally significant sites, humanitarian civil assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), emergency food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians, and public order and safety as it applies to military operations.

69. US Department of the Navy, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, MCWP 3-33.1 (Washington, D.C.: US Marine Corps, 7 April 2003).
70. For a complete description and discussion of these principles, see US Department of the Navy, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, MCWP 3-33.1 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 7 April 2003). 3-8 thru 3-10.
71. Secretary Rumsfeld asked the DSB to consider the tasks and activities associated with transition to and from hostilities in order to define the necessary capabilities (skills and systems) required for success. The DSB was to consider capabilities across this spectrum of activities from peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction. The DSB framed the guidance even further by considering, “activities that should be undertaken in peacetime with the objective of avoiding large-scale hostilities by better orchestrating all the instruments of US power. And, failing in that aim, what activities should be undertaken in peacetime to be more successful in the stabilization and reconstruction operations that commonly follow large-scale hostilities—operations critical for achieving US political goals, not just military goals. The DSB considered the period ranging from peacetime, through large-scale hostili-

- ties, through stabilization and then reconstruction as a continuum, with none of these activities having a clear beginning or end. From US Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board, 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004), iii.
72. The DSB's recommendations were reviewed by the SECDEF and the results promulgated in DoD Directive 3000.cc, "Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities (DRAFT)," dated September 17, 2004. During the approval process, DoDD 3000.cc was transformed into DoDD 3000.ccE, highlighted previously in Chapter 2. This DoDD is currently in Final Review.
 73. US Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board, 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004), vii.
 74. The DSB also concluded that the certain tasks need to be performed in any nation-building operation. In priority, these are: security (demobilizing former combatants, rebuilding police, and establishing a justice system), basic governance (public administration, and public services (waste and sewage removal, water purification and distribution, public educations, power), macroeconomic and regulatory functions (establishment of a stable currency, resumption of commerce), political reform (free press, civil society, political parties, and elections), and traditional economic development.
 75. US Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, 43.
 76. *Ibid.*, 44.
 77. *Ibid.*, 59.
 78. "As part of its outreach to build the case for necessary reforms, the BG-N study team serves as an honest broker among the various stakeholders, including between and among the Defense Department (DoD), the State Department, the White House, and the Congress, as well as among the various parties in DoD. In support of the project, the BG-N study team regularly convenes a wide and diverse body of largely former, deeply experienced military, defense and non-defense officials to seek their judgment on a wide range of pressing issues." The Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Security Program Home Page, available from <http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/>; Internet; accessed 20 September 2005.
 79. "The Phase 1 recommendations were widely briefed to the most senior-level civilian and military officials, who reacted very positively. However, to date, few, if any, actions have been taken to implement the BG-N Phase 1 change agenda. In part, of course, this reflects the crowded policy agenda of national leaders when the country is at war during what was an election year. But it also reflects how hard it is to change a massive bureaucracy like DoD." From the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Gov-*

- ernment and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, July 2005), 15.
80. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, Phase 1 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 67.
 81. Ibid., 44.
 82. Ibid., 56.
 83. Ibid., 117.
 84. The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the United States Department of State and the United States Institute of Peace, "Stability Operations: Where We Are and the Road Ahead," symposium report (Carlisle, PA: USAPKSOI, 13-14 December 2004), 3.
 85. This symposium provided an opportunity for both military and civilian agencies and organizations involved in stability operations to share their collective experiences and lessons learned, and to inform other conference participants of their respective organizations' capabilities and current and planned activities. PME was one of the focus areas deliberated. From The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the United States Department of State and the United States Institute of Peace, *Stability Operations: Where We Are and the Road Ahead*, symposium report (Carlisle, PA: USAPKSOI, 13-14 December 2004), 3.
 86. The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the United States Department of State and the United States Institute of Peace, "Stability Operations: Where We Are and the Road Ahead," 15.
 87. From the author's perspective, it would be easy to conclude that no matter what curricula changes occur, it will not be sufficient because the Services are not likely to increase PME course length regardless of how many more *Learning Areas* are prescribed and by what authority.
 88. Operational Art, as posited by Karl von Clausewitz, is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Strategists argue whether his original thoughts ever envisioned the state of war as it is today. At the time of writings, armies focused on the defeat of an opposing army and not on infrastructure building in order to facilitate any transition to a legal authority. The term CMO would not have been a concept in his day since armies had no reason to focus on such operations. Other strategists argue that Clausewitz's theory of Operational Art was so brilliant that it would serve to provide a time-enduring framework for any type of future operation conducted by any army.
 89. The International Crisis Group is an independent, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, with over 110 staff members on five conti-

nents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

90. Buffalo, 1.

91. US Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, 114.

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Interviews

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- Colonel James T. LaRue, US Army (Retired), interview by author, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 3 December 2004.
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